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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Difﬁculties  in  self–other  processing  lie  at the core  of  schizophrenia  and  pose  a problem  for  patients’
daily  social  functioning.  In the present  selective  review,  we  provide  a framework  for  understanding
self–other  integration  and  distinction,  and  impairments  herein  in schizophrenia.  For this  purpose,  we  dis-
cuss classic  motor  prediction  models  in relation  to mirror  neuron  functioning,  theory  of  mind,  mimicry,






nitive  expectation  models  in these  phenomena,  and  argue  that  these  cognitive  models  form  an  essential
contribution  to our  understanding  of  self–other  integration  and  distinction.  In  doing  so, we bring  together
different  lines  of  research  and  connect  ﬁndings  from  social  psychology,  affective  neuropsychology,  and
psychiatry  to further  our understanding  of  when  and  how  people  integrate  versus distinguish  self and
other,  and  how  this  goes  wrong  in schizophrenia  patients.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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In daily life people rarely act in social isolation. To ensure ﬂu-
nt and efﬁcient social interaction people have to coordinate and
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/).integrate other people’s thoughts, emotions, and behavioral inten-
tions with their own  (e.g., representing both one’s own and another
person’s movements and grip when passing the salt). A prereq-
uisite for doing this is the ability to distinguish between self and
other. After all, when confusing self and other, one may  project
one’s own  intentions and emotions onto others, or take over the
intentions and emotions of others. As such, it becomes challeng-
ing to develop a personal identity, regulate behavior, or hold one
another responsible for certain behavior.































































sA. van der Weiden et al. / Neuroscience a
As social beings, our brain seems to be designed to integrate
ur own and other people’s intentions and emotions, as well as
o distinguish between self and other. In most individuals integra-
ion and distinction of self and other is a well-balanced process,
hich occurs without effort or conscious attention. However, not
veryone is blessed with the capacity to balance self–other dis-
inction and integration. Speciﬁcally, schizophrenia patients often
xperience no control over their behavior and exhibit difﬁculties
n distinguishing their own feelings, intentions, actions and their
utcomes from those of others. Accordingly, recent literature has
ocused on self-disturbances as a possible explanation for both
ositive (i.e., extra thoughts, feelings, and behaviors not seen in
ealthy controls, e.g., delusions of control, auditory hallucinations,
randiosity, and delusions of reference) and negative symptoms
f schizophrenia (Sass and Parnas, 2003; i.e., absence of normal
houghts, feelings, and behaviors, e.g., affective ﬂattening, apa-
hy, anhedonia, and avolition; Sass, 2014). Moreover, recent work
hows that self–other disturbances (e.g., externalizing action con-
rol, aberrant self-awareness, and misunderstanding other people’s
ntentions and emotions) are already present in early stages of
he disease (Amminger et al., 2012; An et al., 2010; Parnas et al.,
011; Thompson et al., 2013, 2012) and might even be predic-
ive of schizophrenia onset in symptomatic and genetically high
isk individuals (Nelson et al., 2012; Parnas et al., 2014). Such
ndings indicate that self-disturbances lie at the core of the dis-
ase (Bleuler, 1911; Hemsley, 1998; Mishara et al., 2014; Sass and
arnas, 2003).
With regard to self–other processing, evidence shows that,
lthough schizophrenia patients are able to integrate their own and
thers’ (sometimes misinterpreted) behaviors and emotions (Abu-
kel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2013), they typically exhibit difﬁculties
n distinguishing their own behaviors and emotions from those of
thers (Asai et al., 2011; Ford et al., 2007; Jardri et al., 2011, 2009).
or example, some patients hear voices which they actually (sub
ocally) produce themselves (Gould, 1948; Green and Kinsbourne,
990; Van der Gaag, 2006), feel their limb movements being con-
rolled by aliens (Frith, 2005), or think they caused events that
re actually caused by someone else, as in delusions of reference
Synofzik et al., 2013a). In addition, a lack of self–other distinc-
ion may  explain why patients get more easily distressed when
onfronted with the distress of others (i.e., emotional contagion;
ontag et al., 2007).
Thus, abnormal processing of self and other is reﬂected in
linical symptoms, but also in an array of neural, social cogni-
ive, and behavioral dysfunctions (Nelson et al., 2014). As such,
t may  be an important factor in explaining impaired social func-
ioning in schizophrenia patients. Indeed, schizophrenia patients
ften struggle in social interactions (Patterson et al., 2001; Pinkham
nd Penn, 2006; Pinkham et al., 2007) and this is an outcome
f the disease that patients ﬁnd extremely difﬁcult to cope with
Gorwood et al., 2013; S´witaj et al., 2012). The difﬁculties patients
ncounter in social interaction are usually explained by impair-
ents in social cognition (Fett et al., 2011), for example in theory
f mind (Brown et al., 2014). As social cognition is deﬁned as ‘the
bility to construct representations of the relation between one-
elf and others and to use those representations ﬂexibly to guide
ocial behavior’ (Adolphs, 2001, p. 231), self–other processing is
 crucial aspect of social cognition, and is thus essential to social
unctioning.
Research on social cognition in schizophrenia has so far mainly
ocused on patients’ ability to understand or integrate their own
nd others’ intentions and emotions (e.g., emotion recognition,
heory of mind). Surprisingly, little attention has been devoted to
roblems in self–other distinction. Distinguishing between the two
oncepts is complicated though, as integration and distinction of
elf and other are inextricably intertwined. That is, some processesbehavioral Reviews 57 (2015) 220–237 221
underlying self–other integration may  also affect self–other dis-
tinction, and vice versa. In this review article, we address the
difﬁculties patients face when it comes to integrating as well as dis-
tinguishing self and other, and zoom in on mechanisms that may
underlie self–other integration and distinction.
We can distinguish two major mechanistic models. So far,
most work proposes that self–other processing crucially relies on
the extent to which our motor control system is able to pre-
dict our own  as well as others’ actions and outcomes. However,
people cannot always rely on motor predictions to integrate or
distinguish self and other (i.e., when one has no clear prediction
of one’s own or others’ actions, for example when actions may
result in a variety of outcomes). In line with this notion, a second
model has been proposed that takes into account, and empha-
sizes, the role of people’s cognitions about their own and others’
action-outcomes.
First, we will review research that was initially developed to
map  the perception and understanding of behaviors, intentions,
and emotions of others (other-perspective). This research mainly
focused on self–other integration, but we will show that it also pro-
vides insight into self–other distinction. Speciﬁcally, we will discuss
the role of motor prediction as reﬂected in mirror neuron function
and its implications for theory of mind and mimicry. Next, we will
review research that was initially developed to map the perception
and understanding of one’s own behaviors, intentions, and emotions
as distinct from those of others (self-perspective). Here, we specif-
ically focus on the role of motor prediction in self-awareness and
self-agency phenomena. In addition, we  will discuss more recent
research that suggests that self–other distinction does not always
arise from motor prediction processes, but may also result from
cognitive expectation processes that deal with information pertain-
ing to one’s own  and others’ behaviors, beliefs, and emotions. Fig. 1
shows a heuristic model depicting how the different motor predic-
tion and cognitive expectation processes that will be discussed aid
self–other integration and distinction.
Essentially, we propose that motor prediction and cognitive
expectation processes are both affected in schizophrenia, and
may  each explain disturbances in self–other integration and dis-
tinction depending on the requirements of the task or context.
Thus far, research on cognitive models of self–other integra-
tion and distinction evolved independently of research on motor
prediction models, although recent studies have emerged inves-
tigating the interaction between cognitive and motor processes
in self-awareness and agency attribution (Gentsch and Schütz-
Bosbach, 2011; Moore et al., 2009; Sato, 2009; van der Weiden
et al., 2013a). Furthermore, research on self–other integration
mainly focused on the role of motor prediction in understand-
ing other people’s intentions and emotions (other-perspective),
whereas research on self–other distinction mainly focused on the
role of motor prediction in understanding one’s own intentions and
emotions (self-perspective). Our aim is twofold. First, we show
that processes underlying self–other integration and self–other
distinction are associated and may  inﬂuence each other. Sec-
ond, we show that in situations where motor prediction cannot
inform self, other processing is crucially affected by cognitive
expectations.
Our goal is not to provide a complete overview of the avail-
able studies. Rather, we give a selective review in order to bring
together these different lines of research to further our understand-
ing of when and how people integrate or distinguish self and other,
and how this is impaired in schizophrenia patients. Finally, we will
brieﬂy discuss how self–other integration and distinction as result-
ing from motor prediction and cognitive expectation processes
may  affect social functioning in healthy controls and schizophre-
nia patients, and as such pave the way for promising and exciting
directions for future research.






































aFig. 1. This ﬁgure depicts how cognitive and motor pro
. Part 1: perception and understanding of others
other-perspective)
There is consistent and convincing evidence that the motor pre-
iction system plays an important role in the representation of the
ehavior of others (i.e., other-perspective). Hence, motor prediction
s often proposed as a model explaining self–other integration. We
ill integrate ﬁndings from studies on mirror neurons, theory of
ind, and mimicry in healthy controls and schizophrenia patients,
nd explain them in the context of motor prediction. Speciﬁcally,
e discuss how, at the neural level, mirror neurons not only facili-
ate people’s understanding of others’ behaviors and emotions, but
lso play a key role in distinguishing their own behaviors and emo-
ions from those of others (see Section 2.1). In addition, we will
iscuss how theory of mind (Section 2.2) and mimicry (Section 2.3)
ay  be affected by impairments in mirror neuron functioning. Also,
n the latter two sections we will discuss the role of cognitive biases
n theory of mind and mimicry in situations where motor predic-
ions are less reliable (e.g., when actions can have multiple different
onsequences, or when it is unclear who performed the action).
.1. Mirror neurons
Self–other integration.  In the past decade, researchers have iden-
iﬁed speciﬁc neurons that are involved in the processing of both
ne’s own actions and those of others. This so-called mirror neu-
on network consists primarily of the inferior parietal lobe (guiding
ensorimotor action and perception; Mattingley et al., 1998) and
he ventral premotor cortex (involved in action planning and con-
rol; Hoshi and Tanji, 2006; Króliczak et al., 2008) plus the caudal
art of the inferior frontal gyrus (associated with inhibition and
ttentional control; Hampshire et al., 2010), but may  also include
ther areas depending on the characteristics of the observed or
erformed action (e.g., the primary auditory cortex for actions pro-
ucing sounds; see Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009; Molenberghs
t al., 2012 for an overview). This network may  be a fundamental
eature of the brain, which enables implicit action understanding
uring interactions with the outside world (Gallese, 2003). The ﬁrst
tudies on mirror neurons were conducted in macaque monkeys
nd showed that these neurons ﬁred not only when macaques were
rasping for an object themselves, but also when they observed
nother macaque or a human being grasping for an object (Galleses aid self–other integration and self–other distinction.
et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). This pre-reﬂective action simu-
lation demonstrates a link between self and other (Gallese, 2003),
and reﬂects the integration of one’s own and others’ actions.
Recently, similar ﬁndings have been demonstrated in humans
(Cochin et al., 1999, 1998; Hari et al., 1998; Mukamel et al., 2010).
However, in contrast to early conceptions of the mirror neuron
system that have been extensively debated (Hickok and Hauser,
2010; Hickok, 2009; Steinhorst and Funke, 2014), recent studies
suggest that mirror neurons do not simply activate an identical
(i.e., mirroring) motor representation of the physical properties
of the observed behavior. Rather, mirror neuron responsiveness is
goal-dependent (Bonini et al., 2013; Ocampo and Kritikos, 2011),
highlighting the central role of mirror neurons in higher level action
understanding. That is, mirror neurons are equally responsive to a
variety of actions (e.g., grasping or scooping) aimed at the same
goal (e.g., eating), while mirror neurons are differentially activated
for identical actions (e.g., grasping) with different goals (e.g., eat-
ing or placing). Furthermore, brain activation in the mirror neuron
network is more pronounced when one observes another person’s
incomplete actions (grasping a cup in order to drink), rather than
observing past action phases (Urgesi et al., 2010). Speciﬁcally, both
during the planning of one’s own actions and during the observa-
tion of others’ actions, the same (mirror) neurons are activated in
the premotor cortex. In other words, the observed ongoing action
corresponds with an action that is familiar to the observer, enabling
the observer to predict the actor’s action-outcomes (see also Kilner
et al., 2007).
Furthermore, mirror neurons do not only serve to understand or
anticipate simple hand actions, but are also involved in understand-
ing and anticipating more subtle emotional expressions (Carr et al.,
2003; Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005). Speciﬁcally,
overlapping brain areas (including the mirror neuron network and
the limbic system) are activated when imitating or merely observ-
ing facial expressions (Carr et al., 2003; Molenberghs et al., 2012).
Also, mirror neuron activity has been related to emotional empathy,
indicating that mirror neurons play a key role in the understand-
ing of other people’s emotions (Kaplan and Iacoboni, 2006). Thus,
the mirror neuron system is essential and fundamental for social
interaction where people have to coordinate their behavior with
others and anticipate and integrate the behavioral and emotional
consequences of their own  and others’ actions (see also Sobhani
et al., 2012). As such, the mirror neuron network has been primarily
A. van der Weiden et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 57 (2015) 220–237 223
















































ahe  motor cortex is usually higher when predicting one’s own  behavior compared w
eople’s behavior results in the same amount of neural activation as predicting or p
nd  could lead to the perception of illusory relations between one’s own and other 
ssociated with understanding and integrating people’s own  and
ther’s behaviors and emotions.
Self–other distinction.  The mirror neuron network is also cru-
ially involved in distinguishing between one’s own and others’
ehaviors or emotions. That is, a subset of mirror neurons in the
ippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, and entorhinal cortex show
atterns of inhibition during action observation, while patterns of
xcitation are found during action performance. This differential
attern of activation has been proposed to be one of the funda-
ental mechanisms underlying self–other distinction (Mukamel
t al., 2010). Mirror neurons thus allow one to simulate, anticipate,
nd understand the behavior of others (i.e., self–other integration),
hile at the same time they facilitate the distinction between one’s
wn and others’ actions (Veluw and Chance, 2014).
Mirror neuron function in schizophrenia.  Studies in schizophre-
ia patients have shown that, similar to what happens in
ealthy people, the mirror neuron network is activated both
n case of observing and performing an action (Jardri et al.,
011; McCormick et al., 2012; Thakkar et al., 2014). However,
atients show abnormalities in the extent to which mirror neu-
on networks are activated when performing or observing actions.
peciﬁcally, compared with healthy controls, patients show over-
ll reduced activity in the mirror neuron network (i.e., inferior
arietal lobe, (pre)motor cortices, and inferior frontal gyrus),
nd this reduction has been related to negative symptoms and
mpaired social cognition (for a review: Mehta et al., 2014). This
uggests that schizophrenia patients may  be capable of under-
tanding and anticipating (and thus integrating) the behavior of
thers, but possibly do this to a lesser extent than do healthy
ontrols.
In addition, mirror neuron activity in schizophrenia patients
oes not differentiate between self-performed and other-
erformed actions (Jardri et al., 2011; McCormick et al., 2012;
hakkar et al., 2014), making it more difﬁcult to distinguish
etween self and other. For example, in the study by Jardri and
olleagues (2011) participants had to listen to their own  recorded
oice while mentally repeating the words (i.e., self-generated
oice), and had to passively listen to unfamiliar voices (i.e., other-
enerated voice) and reverse-taped voices (i.e., control condition).
esults revealed that when comparing self- versus other-generated
oice, patients showed increased neural overlap in terms of space
nd amplitude in the medial frontal, medial parietal, and right mid-
le temporal cortices as well as the right inferior parietal lobule.
he increased overlap in the right inferior parietal lobule was due
o increased activation in this area for self-produced voice com-
ared with healthy controls, which may  explain for example why
ome patients perceive their own voice as being externally gener-
ted (i.e., auditory hallucinations). In line with this notion, the leveldicting other people’s behavior. However, in schizophrenia, the prediction of other
g one’s own behavior. This may  be a consequence of imprecise motor predictions,
e’s behavior.
of activity in the right inferior parietal lobule positively correlated
with positive symptoms.
Reduced activation and differentiation in the mirror neuron
network may thus explain part of the negative and positive symp-
toms of schizophrenia, respectively. The lack of activation and/or
self–other distinction at the mirror neuron level may  further com-
plicate the planning, monitoring, performance, and regulation of
actions (see also part 2 of this review). Alternatively, as mirror
neuron activation in the premotor cortex reﬂects the prediction
and anticipation of the behavior of others, it may be that patients’
impairments in motor prediction lead to less precise and thus more
overlapping mirror neuron activation for their own and other’s
behavior. There may  even be a bi-directional relationship between
mirror neuron function and motor prediction (see Fig. 2). Future
research may  be able to identify the direction of causality in this
respect.
2.2. Theory of mind
Current directions in social neuroscience suggest that mirror
neuron functioning is crucial for an adequate theory of mind
(Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2009, 1989), commonly
deﬁned as the understanding of other people’s intentions and
behavior (i.e., cognitive theory of mind) and other people’s emo-
tions (i.e., affective theory of mind; Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory,
2013). Indeed, according to simulation theory, a basic recognition
(Bora et al., 2005) and understanding of other people’s behav-
iors and emotions can result from the motor simulation of these
behaviors and emotions by the mirror neuron system (cf. simula-
tion theory; Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2009, 1989).
However, in complex social situations where the understanding
of other people’s behaviors and emotions requires an appreciation
of social rules, motor simulation is not sufﬁcient. These situations
additionally require people to rely on cognitive theories or beliefs
(cf., theory theory; Gopnik and Wellman, 1992; Perner and Howes,
1992). For example, people have to draw upon cognitive beliefs and
theories in order to understand whether people in the direct social
environment are laughing with or at you, or to understand why
someone says to ﬁnd something tasty while her face expresses dis-
gust (e.g., lying, being polite, or being sarcastic), or why  someone
who just won the lottery is crying (i.e., tears of joy). The under-
standing of such complex intentions and emotions requires the
integration of different (sometimes conﬂicting) messages that are
difﬁcult to understand when merely simulating a person’s facial or
bodily expressions.
Theory of mind in schizophrenia.  So far, the evidence regarding
schizophrenia patients’ theory of mind is inconsistent. Some stud-
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006; Brüne, 2003; Pousa et al., 2008; Sarfati et al., 1999; Walston
t al., 2000; Walter et al., 2009), while others indicate impairments
n theory of mind in schizophrenia (Brüne, 2005; Derntl et al., 2009;
reen et al., 2012; Haker and Rössler, 2009; Langdon et al., 2006a;
arcin et al., 2010) as well as in populations at high risk to develop
chizophrenia (Chung et al., 2008; Marjoram et al., 2006). Based on
he above, there are several possible explanations for the inconsis-
ent ﬁndings. First, theory of mind may  be differentially affected by
atients’ ability to integrate others’ intentions and emotions, and
heir ability to distinguish others’ intentions and emotions from
heir own. Second, as theory of mind is informed by motor sim-
lation as well as cognitive belief processes that may  each rely
n different neural processes (Mahy et al., 2014), abnormalities in
ither one may  be present in schizophrenia. Integration and dis-
inction of self and other within both motor and cognitive processes
ill be described below.
Motor simulation and theory of mind in schizophrenia.  Accord-
ng to simulation theory, the mere simulation of other people’s
ehaviors and emotions is sufﬁcient to arrive at a basic recogni-
ion and integration of those behaviors and emotions. In line with
he notion that schizophrenia patients are able to simulate other
eople’s behaviors and emotions (Jardri et al., 2011; McCormick
t al., 2012; Thakkar et al., 2014), there is converging evidence that
atients perform equally well as controls in attributing basic mental
tates (Brüne, 2003; Pousa et al., 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007).
hat is, patients perform equally well as healthy controls on ﬁrst
rder theory of mind tasks, which require a basic understanding of
ow someone else feels or what the other person is thinking.
However, because schizophrenia patients show a lack of dif-
erentiation in the simulation versus expression of behaviors and
motions (Jardri et al., 2011; McCormick et al., 2012; Thakkar et al.,
014), they may  experience difﬁculty distinguishing the behav-
ors and emotions of others from their own. As a consequence,
atients may  mistake other people’s intentions or emotions for
heir own (e.g., emotion contagion). Indeed, ample studies sug-
est that patients typically become more easily distressed when
bserving someone else in distress (Corbera et al., 2013; Decety and
amm,  2011; McCormick et al., 2012; Montag et al., 2007; Ruby and
ecety, 2004; Smith et al., 2015). Similarly, one may  speculate that
atients may  also be more likely to experience others’ intentions as
heir own, a phenomenon also referred to as goal contagion (Aarts
t al., 2004). Such emotion (and possibly goal) contagion provides
dditional support for the notion that patients are able to form a
asic understanding of others’ intentions and emotions.
Cognitive beliefs and theory of mind in schizophrenia.  It is only
hen situations get more complicated or demanding (and motor
imulation becomes less informative) that schizophrenia patients
truggle to understand other people’s intentions, and especially
motions (Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2013; Corcoran et al.,
995; De Achával et al., 2010). In line with this notion, patients
erform worse than healthy controls on more complex (second
rder) theory of mind tasks (Brüne, 2005), and this impairment has
artly been explained by individual differences and task demands
n IQ and working memory load (Brüne, 2003; Pousa et al., 2008), as
ell as processing speed (Brennan et al., 2014). Speciﬁcally, this lat-
er study showed that while patients initially (within 70 ms)  show
educed facial and emotional processing compared with controls,
hey do show enhanced later processing (Brennan et al., 2014). In
ynamic social interactions, this slowed emotion processing may
inder emotion identiﬁcation and integration (Derntl et al., 2009;
reen et al., 2012; Haker and Rössler, 2009; Kring and Elis, 2013), as
motional expressions are very dynamic in nature and may  rapidly
hange from one moment to another (Scherer, 2009).
Another consequence of patients’ increased processing time
s that they have less time to consider the social context. Per-
aps as a consequence, patients have been shown to pay lessbehavioral Reviews 57 (2015) 220–237
attention to the social context when inferring mental states of oth-
ers (Green et al., 2008), and may  fail to perceive, or may  misperceive
causal relationships between the social context and other peo-
ple’s intentions, actions, or emotions (Green et al., 2010; Hemsley,
2005a,b). Such misperceptions may  be further exacerbated by neu-
ral abnormalities (Bosia et al., 2012; Walter et al., 2009), diminished
executive functioning (e.g., reduced working memory capacity, or
difﬁculty ﬁltering relevant from irrelevant information; Hemsley
and Zawada, 1976; Lee and Park, 2005), and/or cognitive biases
(Green et al., 2010; Langdon et al., 2006b). Indeed, patients are gen-
erally less accurate in identifying other people’s mental states (e.g.,
happy or embarrassed) when embedded in a social context (e.g., a
laughing person surrounded by other laughing people; Green et al.,
2008; Kring and Campellone, 2012; Kring and Elis, 2013).
Patients’ failure to take into account the social context may  fur-
ther explain why schizophrenia patients typically show difﬁculties
understanding and integrating more complex intentions as com-
municated through lies or sarcasm (Derntl et al., 2009; Green et al.,
2012), or as seen in faux pas tests that require people to detect and
interpret violations of social rules (De Achával et al., 2010; Zhu et al.,
2007). That is, in complex and dynamic situations where motor sim-
ulation is less informative, patients may  develop and draw upon
cognitive theories and beliefs about the mental states of others,
devoid of social contextual nuances or based on a false, biased
perception of the social context. Consequently, patients may expe-
rience particular problems with social functioning. Indeed, research
indicates that theory of mind functioning in schizophrenia patients
is an important contributor to social behavior in clinical settings
(Brüne, 2005; Brüne et al., 2007), community functioning (Roncone
et al., 2002), and interpersonal skills (Pinkham and Penn, 2006).
In order to gain more insight in how people arrive at a theory
of mind, and to enhance our understanding of impairments herein,
future research should appreciate that in line with abnormalities
in mirror neuron activation, impairments in theory of mind may
result from both reduced integration (e.g., misperception of others’
intentions and emotions) and distinction (e.g., emotional conta-
gion) of self and other, and these processes may sometimes be
difﬁcult to disentangle. For instance, patients may  adopt misper-
ceived emotions of others, reﬂecting difﬁculties in integration as
well as distinction of self and other. Furthermore, future research
should take into consideration whether theory of mind perfor-
mance results primarily from motor simulation processes or from
cognitive theories or beliefs, and how these processes interact. For
example, it would be interesting to assess to what extent patients
beneﬁt from motor simulation when cognitively inferring the men-
tal states of others (e.g., happy) by manipulating motor simulation
ability (e.g., blocking the smiling muscles by biting a pen or wear-
ing a mouthguard; Oberman et al., 2007; Rychlowska et al., 2014;
Strack et al., 1988).
2.3. Mimicry
Mirror neuron activity does not only contribute to under-
standing other people’s behaviors and emotions through motor
simulation, it may  even trigger the same behavioral or emotional
expressions in the observer (Iacoboni, 2009). That is, people often
subtly mimic  (anticipated) behaviors and emotional expressions of
others (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Frijda, 2010) and this functions
as a ‘social glue’ by facilitating empathy (Maurer and Tindall, 1983;
Stel and Vonk, 2010), helping behavior (Fischer-Lokou et al., 2011;
Guéguen et al., 2011; Stel et al., 2008), feelings of closeness (Ashton-
James et al., 2007; Lakin and Chartrand, 2003), and by reducing
prejudice (Inzlicht et al., 2012).
Self–other integration and distinction.  Similar to theory of mind,
mimicry does not simply result from motor simulation, but is
conditional to the social context. Speciﬁcally, people only mimic
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Table  1
Summary of motor and cognitive processes involved in schizophrenia patients’ impairments in the perception of other people’s behaviors and emotions, and their implications
for  normal (in italic) versus abnormal (in bold) self–other integration and self–other distinction.





1.  Mirror neurons Activation when grasping and
when seeing someone else
grasping
Activation when grasping and
when seeing someone else
grasping
Intact ability to integrate
self and other
Difference in activation for
self-produced versus
other-produced actions
No differentiation of self-produced
and other-produced actions
Less distinction of one’s
own  and others’ actions
2.  Theory of mind




between one’s own and
others’ intentions (e.g., goal
contagion)
•  Basic emotions Understanding others’ emotions Too much simulation Too much integration Less distinction between




•  Complex intentions Understanding others’ intentions Impaired understanding of





•  Complex emotions Understanding others’ emotions Impaired understanding of






































c3.  Mimicry Mimicry of others’ (anticipated)
behaviors and emotions depending
on the social context
Inappropriate
thers when it serves an afﬁliative purpose (Bourgeois and Hess,
008; Chartrand et al., 2005; Cheng and Chartrand, 2003; Hess and
ischer, 2013; Lakin et al., 2008). For example, one would mimic
he fear of friends, but laugh at the fear of foes. Hence, mimicry,
ust as theory of mind, is crucially affected by cognitive theories or
eliefs about the other person’s personality (e.g., friendly versus
nfriendly) or background (e.g., in-group versus out-group). In
ssence then, cognitive processes promote self–other integration
e.g., with friendly people), as well as self–other distinction (e.g.,
rom unfriendly people), depending on the other person’s identity
nd on the social context.
Mimicry in schizophrenia.  As schizophrenia patients have more
ifﬁculty taking the context in consideration (Green et al., 2008;
emsley, 2005a,b; Penn et al., 2002), they may  be more likely
o show abnormal mimicry behavior. Indeed, research suggests
hat schizophrenia patients show either excessive mimicry (Kring
t al., 1999), or a lack of (or atypical) mimicry (Haker and Rössler,
009; Park et al., 2008; Varcin et al., 2010). Such abnormal mimicry
ehavior reﬂects patients’ difﬁculties in self–other integration as
ell as self–other distinction. However, little is known about
he underlying mechanisms responsible for patients’ abnormal
imicry behavior. There is some evidence that mimicry is nega-
ively related to negative symptoms and poor social functioning
Haker and Rössler, 2009; Matthews et al., 2013; Park et al., 2008).
owever, it often remains unclear whether patients’ abnormalities
n mimicry behavior result from an inability to take the social con-
ext into account (resulting in excessive or atypical mimicry), from
 decreased afﬁliative motivation of the mimicker (resulting in a
ack of mimicry), or from cognitive theories or beliefs the mimicker
as about the (anticipated) intentions or emotions of the mimickee
resulting in atypical mimicry, which may  also be misinterpreted
s a lack of mimicry when expressions identical to those expressed
y the mimickee are expected but not seen). By taking these
actors into account, future research may  unravel the processes that




3. Summary part 1
In summary (see also Table 1), we discussed how motor predic-
tions and mirror neuron activation are involved in the anticipation
and understanding of other people’s behaviors and emotions
(theory of mind). Crucially, based on the presence of mirror neu-
ron activation, schizophrenia patients are able to integrate self
and other. However, the lack of differentiation in activation for
self-produced versus other-produced actions causes patients to
integrate the intentions and emotions of others too much (reﬂected
in abnormal theory of mind). We further showed that impairments
at the motor level makes patients more dependent on less reli-
able cognitive theories and beliefs regarding the intentions and
emotions of others. This not only impairs their understanding (i.e.,
integration) of others (i.e., theory of mind), but also their behavioral
reactions (mimicry), which is detrimental for social functioning.
4. Part 2: perception and understanding of self
(self-perspective)
In addition to processes that are involved in understanding other
people’s behavior, people also crucially rely on basic motor predic-
tion processes that are associated with understanding their own
behavior when distinguishing and integrating self and other. Actu-
ally, the very same notion that motor predictions are differentially
associated with our own  and others’ actions and emotions inspired
researchers to study the role of motor prediction processes in the
awareness of our own  actions (e.g., in terms of effectiveness, inten-
sity, or duration; see Section 4.1) and attributions of self-agency
(i.e., the explicit distinction between self and other as the cause
of behavior; see Section 4.2). We  will argue that, in addition to
the role of motor predictions, cognitive expectations also play a
crucial role in action-awareness and agency attributions. Further-
more, although the literature on these topics primarily focused
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n self–other distinction, we will also discuss implications for
elf–other integration.
.1. Action awareness
According to the classic comparator model (Frith and Done,
009; Frith, 2012), the motor system stores copies of each out-
owing action signal (i.e., efference copies) that carry predictive
nformation about the sensory consequences of the action. The
otor system continuously compares these internally predicted
utcomes with actual perceived outcomes and, if necessary,
pdates the predictions based on the received sensory feedback
see also Sober and Sabes, 2003). As such, the motor system plays
 crucial role in the planning and regulation of one’s own behav-
or. Although such action monitoring and regulation can take place
ithout conscious awareness (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998),
eople usually become aware of their actions when distortions
i.e., a mismatch between prediction and sensory feedback) reach
 certain threshold and become noticeable.
Action awareness in schizophrenia.  Schizophrenia patients show
mpairments in the motor prediction processes that are involved
n the monitoring and regulation of action (see Farrer and Franck,
007 for an overview). Speciﬁcally, a recent study revealed that
lthough schizophrenia patients show relatively normal brain acti-
ation during sensory feedback processing (but see Horan et al.,
012 for a more complex picture), they do show reduced sensorim-
tor activation preceding action execution, which reﬂects reduced
otor prediction. Furthermore, in contrast to healthy controls,
otor prediction and sensory feedback processing did not correlate
n patients (Bender et al., 2012), indicating an interruption in the
ormation and updating of motor predictions. As a consequence,
atients with schizophrenia have more difﬁculty learning asso-
iations between their actions and subsequent outcomes (Jones
t al., 1991; Serra et al., 2001), and are typically less sensitive
o behavioral distortions (Hommes et al., 2012; Malenka et al.,
982; Synofzik et al., 2010). For example, Synofzik and colleagues
2010) had participants perform out-of-sight pointing movements
hile observing false movement feedback (i.e., rotated to a certain
xtent). Compared with healthy controls, schizophrenia patients
howed a larger threshold for detecting inconsistencies between
heir actual movement and the visual feedback (21.4◦ versus 13.1◦
istorted in angle). Interestingly, there is suggestive evidence that
his impaired sensitivity is speciﬁc to certain psychotic symptoms.
hat is, impaired error detection has been related to paranoid-
allucinatory syndrome or formal thought disorders (Knoblich
t al., 2004), and even to subclinical positive symptoms in unaf-
ected siblings of patients with schizophrenia (Hommes et al.,
012).
Action awareness may  also be affected by action monitoring in
 more indirect manner. Speciﬁcally, evidence shows that motor
redictions as well as cognitive expectations affect (a) the intensity
f action awareness through a process called sensory attenuation,
nd (b) the temporal awareness of action events through a process
alled temporal binding. We  will discuss how sensory attenua-
ion and temporal binding contribute to the distinction, but also
ntegration, of one’s own and other’s actions.
Sensory attenuation. Because people are able to predict quite pre-
isely the sensory consequences of their own actions, they already
xperience to some extent what the action will feel like before
ctually performing the action. As a consequence, if the sensory
onsequences match one’s internal predictions, the actual expe-
ience feels less intense (Roussel et al., 2013; Timm et al., 2014;
aszak et al., 2012). This so-called sensory attenuation is a funda-
ental phenomenon and is even witnessed in lower order species
uch as crickets (Poulet and Hedwig, 2002) and weak electric ﬁsh
Bell, 2001).Fig. 3. This ﬁgure depicts the sensory attenuation of internally predicted behavioral
outcomes, and how this sensory attenuation may inform self–other distinction.
The attenuation of predicted sensations is an essential mech-
anism that enables people to distinguish between actions and
outcomes they produced themselves and actions and outcomes
that are caused by others. That is, people are generally better at
predicting the sensory consequences of their own actions as com-
pared with those of other people’s actions (see Fig. 3), causing
self-produced sensations to feel less intense than other-produced
sensations. This is, for example, why  it feels much more intense
when one is tickled by someone else, compared with when one
tickles oneself (Blakemore et al., 1998).
Sensory attenuation for one’s own  versus others’ actions resem-
bles the differentiation in activation of one’s own  and others’
actions in the mirror neuron network. This is not surprising as
both sensory attenuation and mirror neuron activation rely on the
precision of internal motor predictions. Also, there is suggestive
evidence that sensory attenuation correlates with activation in the
frontoparietal network, which is part of the mirror neuron network
(Hughes and Waszak, 2011). Perhaps there is also a direct relation-
ship between mirror neuron activation and sensory attenuation,
such that increased activity in the mirror neuron network for one’s
own  actions results in increased sensory attenuation for one’s own
actions, and hence an increased ability to distinguish one’s own
from others’ actions.
Interestingly, recent research suggests that sensory attenuation
is speciﬁcally attuned to distinguish self and other, as the atten-
uation of behavioral outcomes increases when interacting with
other people (Weiss et al., 2011). Speciﬁcally, this research suggests
that other people’s action-outcomes are attenuated when produced
upon one’s own  request compared with when they are produced
by the other person individually. Thus, as long as one is at least
partly responsible for an action, performed by either self or other,
sensory attenuation is present. Crucially however, in such interac-
tive social contexts, one’s own  actions performed upon the other’s
request also become more attenuated than usual, possibly due to
an increased attention to one’s own actions in order to prevent
self–other confusion.
Sensory attenuation in schizophrenia.  Schizophrenia patients are
impaired in the motor prediction processes that are involved in
the awareness of action, which signiﬁcantly undermines their
ability to distinguish between self and other. Speciﬁcally, recent
electroencephalography (EEG) research has demonstrated that
schizophrenia patients show impairments in the efference copies
that are generated by the motor system (Bender et al., 2012; Ford
et al., 2014, 2008). This manifests itself in less motor activation
before action performance (i.e., less anticipation), and increased
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t al., 2014, 2008). Because of this lack of sensory attenuation,
elf-produced outcomes feel similar as other-produced outcomes,
aking it more difﬁcult to distinguish one’s own action–outcomes
rom those of others.
Indeed, in an inventive study by Blakemore and colleagues
2000), investigating sensory attenuation in schizophrenia, bipo-
ar, and depressed patients, participants had to rate the intensity
f a tactile stimulation on the palm of their left hand. This stim-
lation was either self-produced or externally induced. Healthy
ontrol subjects rated the self-produced tactile stimulation as less
ntense than externally produced stimulations (see also Blakemore
t al., 1998). Interestingly, however, patients suffering from audi-
ory hallucinations and/or passivity phenomena failed to notice
 difference in perception between self-produced and externally
nduced stimulation. This decreased sensory attenuation crucially
epended on the presence of these symptoms, and was indepen-
ent of the diagnosis of schizophrenia or (bipolar) depression.
educed tactile sensory attenuation has also been found in patients
ith paranoid symptoms (Bulot et al., 2007) and predominantly
ositive symptoms (Shergill et al., 2005). Furthermore, a single
ase-study showed reduced sensory attenuation in a patient with
erbal auditory hallucinations and delusions of control (Jardri et al.,
009).
The deviant perception of externally generated touch may  not
nly be related to psychotic symptoms, but may also play a role in
atients’ social functioning. That is, research in healthy subjects has
hown that another person’s touch increases compliance (Patterson
t al., 1986; Willis and Hamm,  1980) and strengthens interper-
onal relationships (Gallace and Spence, 2010). Future research
ay  investigate whether patients’ failure to differentiate between
elf-produced and other-produced touch makes them insensitive
o such social inﬂuences.
Patients’ failure to attenuate self-produced outcomes has also
een replicated in the auditory (Ford and Mathalon, 2012; Ford
t al., 2007; Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007) and visual (Leube et al.,
010) domain. For example, Ford and colleagues (2007) exam-
ned the attenuation of speech in patients with schizophrenia.
ttenuation was measured by suppression of the auditory event-
elated EEG potential N1. The results showed that whereas controls
ttenuated their own speech compared with recorded speech,
chizophrenia patients did not. In addition to an increased aware-
ess of aspects of experience that are normally tacit or implicit
Kapur et al., 2005; Sass and Parnas, 2003), the failure to differ-
ntiate between self-produced and externally produced sensory
xperiences may  explain symptoms such as auditory hallucinations
here patients experience self-produced speech as externally con-
rolled (see also Nelson et al., 2014). Indeed, there is some evidence
hat patients with auditory hallucinations show less attenuation
hen hearing an alien voice compared with patients without audi-
ory hallucinations (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007).
Temporal binding. Another way in which the internal predic-
ion of action–outcomes affects action awareness is by changing
he temporal perception of actions and outcomes. In order to
ake sense of our actions and the effects they have on the out-
ide world, our brain has to integrate multiple sensory signals
i.e., multisensory integration). That is, as was also addressed
n the classic comparator model of motor prediction, the brain
ntegrates predictive action signals with signals accompanying
bserved action–outcomes, involving visual, auditive, tactile, and
lfactory modalities. However, some signals take longer than oth-
rs to reach the brain. For example, sound takes longer than vision,
hich is why we perceive lightning to precede thunder. Likewise,he visual perception of touching one’s toe arrives sooner than the
actile perception on one’s toe. To assure a coherent perception of
vents that happened at the same time, but reach the brain at dif-
erent points in time, the brain waits a couple of milliseconds forbehavioral Reviews 57 (2015) 220–237 227
the slowest signal to arrive before integrating the different signals
(Vroomen and Keetels, 2010). This waiting period is also referred to
as the ‘temporal binding window’ (Colonius and Diederich, 2004).
Although this temporal binding window is crucial for action
monitoring, regulation, and awareness, it also creates noise and
may  potentially lead to illusory perceptions of coherence, i.e., per-
ceiving events to co-occur that have nothing to do with each
other. During early childhood, the temporal binding window, and
hence the noise, decreases (Lewkowicz and Flom, 2014), and these
developmental changes persist into adolescence (Hillock-Dunn and
Wallace, 2012). The narrowing of the temporal binding window
over time may  result from an increased precision in the prediction
of action–outcomes. That is, as we grow up, we  learn which signals
are likely to follow our actions (e.g., clapping our hands is bound
to produce a distinct sound, visual pattern, and a certain sensa-
tion in both hands, but is not always followed by the light turning
on), and in what timeframe. As a consequence, the brain may  need
less time to process and integrate these anticipated multisensory
signals (Kail, 1991).
Indeed, learned associations between action events have been
shown to crucially affect whether action events are perceived to
occur at the same time, a phenomenon also referred to as ‘tem-
poral binding’ (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009; Cravo et al., 2009;
Haggard et al., 2002). Speciﬁcally, when having learned that a key
press is always followed by a speciﬁc sound after a predictable
delay (e.g., 100 ms), the action and delayed outcome are perceived
as occurring closer together in time (Eagleman and Holcombe,
2002; Haggard et al., 2002). These prediction effects are so per-
vasive that when the sound is presented earlier than predicted
(e.g., immediately after the key press), this creates the intriguing
illusion of the sound preceding the action (Stetson et al., 2006).
Furthermore, as people are better able to predict the outcomes of
intentional compared to unintentional (e.g., externally triggered)
actions, people generally perceive actions and outcomes as occur-
ring closer together in time when performing intentional rather
than unintentional actions (Haggard and Clark, 2003; Haggard et al.,
2002). For this reason ‘temporal binding’ is also often referred to
as ‘intentional binding’. Thus, motor predictions regarding the co-
occurrence of events shape the perception of time and coherence
(see Fig. 4).
Temporal binding may  be especially useful in social interactions
where people perform actions and cause outcomes simultaneously
or in close temporal proximity, such as when playing a duet on the
piano (i.e., quatre-mains). Speciﬁcally, the precision with which we
can generally predict the outcomes of our own actions narrows the
window within which action–events are bound together in time.
Hence, our own  action–outcomes are more likely to match the pre-
cise internal predictions, and are thus more likely to ﬁt the temporal
binding window. Consequently, our own actions are more likely to
be bound together in time with our own  action–outcomes, rather
than with action–outcomes of others that are less predictable. As
such, the temporal perception of actions and resulting outcomes
may  crucially aid the distinction between our own and other’s
action–outcomes.
In addition, temporal binding may  aid the integration, or
understanding of other people’s behavior. That is, because peo-
ple generally have less precise predictions about the performance
and consequences of other people’s actions, the temporal window
within which actions and outcomes of others’ are bound together
is wider. This enables people to perceive others’ actions as coher-
ent (Obhi and Hall, 2011a,b; Wohlschlager et al., 2003), without
interfering with the monitoring and awareness of their own actions.Temporal binding in schizophrenia. Only recently, studies
addressed temporal binding of actions and outcomes in schizophre-
nia patients (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010). These
studies suggest that, compared with controls, patients have a
















pig. 4. This ﬁgure depicts the temporal binding between behavior and behavioral o
ay  inform self–other distinction.
reater temporal binding window (i.e., more noise) during which
multi)sensory signals are integrated. Consequently, patients are
ore likely to perceive other-produced outcomes as following
rom their own actions and vice versa. As such, patients’ increased
emporal binding window may  crucially affect their temporal
wareness of action, and as such their ability to integrate or dis-
inguish self and other.
Additionally, a recent study indicated that, in contrast to con-
rols, the temporal binding window of patients does not narrow
s the probability of action–outcomes increases (from 50% to 75%;
oss et al., 2010). This insensitivity to the increased likelihood that a
ertain sensory signal results from a certain action may  promote the
ntegration of irrelevant sensory signals that occur after intentional
ction performance. As a consequence, schizophrenia patients may
erceive illusory relations between their own actions, resulting
Fig. 5. This ﬁgure shows how self–other distinction arises from the attenuaties as a consequence of internal motor predictions, and how this temporal binding
action–outcomes, and other events (e.g., the doorbell, a voice on
the radio, lightning), which may  promote the formation of delu-
sions and hallucinations (Corlett et al., 2007; Nathaniel-James and
Frith, 2009).
Cognitive expectations and abnormalities in self-awareness in
schizophrenia. There is recent evidence to suggest that both sensory
attenuation and temporal binding do not only result from motor
prediction processes, but can also arise from cognitive expectations
about the source or outcome of an action (Desantis et al., 2012,
2011; Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Moore et al., 2009). For
example, when outcome expectations are induced by presenting
the action–outcome before action performance (e.g., through prim-
ing), people show stronger sensory attenuation (Gentsch and
Schütz-Bosbach, 2011), and stronger temporal binding between
action and outcome (Moore et al., 2009; see Fig. 5).
on and temporal binding of cognitively expected behavioral outcomes.
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The inﬂuence of such cognitive expectation processes on the
elf-awareness of action has not yet been studied in schizophrenia.
owever, as patients often have false expectations or delusional
eliefs about the potential sources and outcomes of their actions, it
s likely that cognitive processes further complicate self-awareness
f action in schizophrenia. For example, patients suffering from
elusions of control may  expect the outcomes of their actions
o be caused by others, which would decrease sensory attenu-
tion and temporal binding. As a consequence, they are more
ikely to perceive their action–outcomes as unrelated to their own
ction-performance, which would then reinforce their delusions of
ontrol. An intriguing possibility is that cognitive expectation pro-
esses are especially inﬂuential in schizophrenia, as impairments
n motor predictions do not allow patients to differentiate between
heir own and others’ actions. Hence, it is important to gain more
nsight in how cognitive expectation processes interact with motor
rediction processes in producing sensory attenuation and tempo-
al binding in healthy controls and schizophrenia patients. After
ll, cognitive expectations might be potential targets for cognitive
herapy (Fig. 5).
.2. Attributions of agency
As suggested above, impaired self-awareness of actions may
ead patients to attribute self-caused outcomes to the actions of
ther people, or to attribute outcomes caused by others to their
wn actions. This is detrimental for daily (social) functioning, as
orrect attribution of agency is essential to self-perception, social
nteraction, and our society in general (Daprati et al., 1997; Frith,
013; Hirstein and Sifferd, 2011; Lind et al., 1990; Moretto et al.,
011). In this section we will discuss more direct empirical evi-
ence of aberrant agency attributions in schizophrenia. Again, we
ill disentangle the role and implications of motor prediction pro-
esses and cognitive expectation processes. Basically, we  will argue
hat the involvement of cognitive processes increases when motor
rocesses are uninformative or unreliable. Furthermore, how cog-
itive processes affect agency attribution might be dependent on
he symptom proﬁle of a patient.
Agency attribution from a motor perspective. As became apparent
n the last section, the motor system may  play an important role in
he feeling of causing our own actions and resulting outcomes (i.e.,
eeling of agency). First, feelings of agency may  be informed by the
wareness of our own actions (e.g., sensory attenuation and tem-
oral binding). However, when and how action awareness affects
ttributions of agency is still unclear (Dewey and Knoblich, 2014;
bert and Wegner, 2010; Frith, 2013; Synofzik et al., 2013b; van
er Weiden et al., 2013a). For example, when one’s conversation
artner speaks in a soft voice (i.e., resembling sensory attenuation),
ne does not necessarily experience agency over her voice. Second,
otor predictions may  affect agency attributions in a more direct
ay. That is, because people can generally quite precisely predict
he outcomes of their own actions, while they are less accurate in
redicting the actions and outcomes of other people, people typ-
cally attribute agency to themselves when outcomes match their
redictions and to others when outcomes mismatch their predic-
ions (see left side of Fig. 6).
Agency attribution from a motor perspective in schizophrenia.
s referred to previously, there is evidence to suggest that in
atients with schizophrenia motor prediction is distorted (e.g.,
ue to impaired efference copies; Bender et al., 2012; Ford et al.,
014, 2008). As a result, it is more difﬁcult to determine whether
 sensory event matches the internal prediction, and hence, to
ttribute action–outcomes to either self or other. This impairment
s reﬂected in several psychotic symptoms. That is, patients may  be
nclined to attribute agency over self-produced outcomes to oth-
rs (under-attributing agency to self), as in auditory hallucinationsFig. 6. This ﬁgure depicts the contribution of motor prediction and implicit as well
as  explicit cognitive expectation processes to the attribution of agency.
(Gould, 1948; Green and Kinsbourne, 1990; Van der Gaag, 2006),
or delusions of alien control (Frith, 2005). Conversely, patients may
attribute outcomes that were generated by others to themselves
(over-attributing agency to self), such as manifested in grandiose
delusions or delusions of reference (Maeda et al., 2012). Indeed,
although there is still relatively little research on explicit agency
attributions in schizophrenia, both types of misattributions have
been observed in schizophrenia patients (Hur et al., 2014; Johns
et al., 2001; Park and Nasrallah, 2014; Schimansky et al., 2010),
and even in people at-risk to develop the disorder (Hauser et al.,
2011; Johns et al., 2010; Thompson et al., 2013).
Over-attributions of agency in schizophrenia.  In a recent study,
participants’ experiences of agency were measured while feedback
of their cursor movements toward an asterisk in the left or right
upper corner of the computer screen was  manipulated. Partici-
pants either saw real feedback of their movement, or false feedback
(i.e., cursor still moved toward the asterisk, but deviated slightly
in onset, pace, and path from their current movement). Partici-
pants were led to believe that on several trials they would not
see their own  movement, but the movement of the experimenter
who performed the task in another room. At the end of each trial,
participants indicated whether they had seen their own or the
experimenter’s movement. Results showed that, compared with
healthy controls, schizophrenia patients more often identiﬁed the
false feedback movements as self-generated (Schimansky et al.,
2010).
Over-attributions of agency are often explained to result from
too much noise in motor predictions. That is, because of impair-
ments in the internal prediction of action-outcomes, schizophrenia
patients may  perceive outcomes that are in fact slightly deviant
(e.g., spatially or temporally) as matching their internal predictions
(Metcalfe et al., 2012). This perception may  result from patients’
increased temporal binding window, facilitating the multisensory
integration of actions and relevant as well as irrelevant external
events. As a consequence, patients may  learn associations between
their actions and outcomes that actually occur beyond their con-
trol (Corlett et al., 2010). This ﬂexibility in schizophrenia patients’
representation of their own  behavior thus leaves room for over-
attributions of agency.
Over-attributions of external events to the self as a result of
an increased temporal binding window is not limited to over-
attributions of agency over action–outcomes, but also extends to
false attributions of body ownership in schizophrenia patients
(Peled et al., 2000; Thakkar et al., 2011), and individuals with
schizotypal experiences (Asai et al., 2011). That is, the integra-
tion of synchronous multisensory input, i.e., tactile perception of
touch on one’s own hand and visual perception of touch on a rub-
ber hand is known to create the illusion that the rubber hand is
one’s own (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Suzuki et al., 2013). Com-
pared with healthy controls, schizophrenia patients report stronger
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 more ﬂexible representation of their ‘self’, resulting in a reduced
bility to distinguish self and other and a tendency to over-attribute
xternal events or objects (such as a rubber hand) to themselves.
In line with clinical observations, there is empirical support that
ver-attributions of agency are speciﬁcally related to delusions of
ontrol (Hauser et al., 2011), but not with a wider spectrum of ﬁrst-
ank symptoms (i.e., passivity symptoms such as thought insertion,
epersonalization and delusions of alien control; Schimansky et al.,
010).
Under-attributions of agency in schizophrenia.  In contrast to over-
ttributing agency to oneself, there is also convincing evidence that,
ompared with controls, schizophrenia patients tend to under-
ttribute agency over outcomes to themselves (Johns et al., 2001;
enes et al., 2013). In other words, schizophrenia patients typically
ail to recognize their action–outcomes as their own. For instance,
n one study participants had to read sentences aloud while they
imultaneously heard the sentences in their own voice, their own
oice distorted (i.e., increased by 3 semi-tones), or another per-
on’s voice. When asked to indicate whether they heard their own
oice (normal or distorted) or another person’s voice, they were
ore inclined to attribute their own voice to the other person as
ompared with healthy individuals (Johns et al., 2001).
A possible explanation for ﬁnding both over- and under-
ttribution of self-agency in patients is a crucial difference in the
asks used in the different studies. In studies where patients tend
o under-attribute agency to themselves the deviations or distort-
ons from their own, self-produced actions are clearly noticeable
nd can be consciously reﬂected upon. In contrast, studies pro-
iding evidence of over-attribution use subtle deviations from
eople’s own, self-produced actions that may  still be perceived
o match patients’ noisy internal predictions. Cognitive reﬂections
esulting from action awareness thus seem to play a key role in
he attribution of self-agency. Hence, in order to fully understand
hen patients over- versus under-attribute agency to themselves,
t is important to also consider the cognitive processes underlying
xperiences of agency.
Agency attribution from a cognitive perspective.  In situations
here motor prediction of the outcome of our action is uninforma-
ive or less reliable, cognitive inferences of agency are especially
nﬂuential (Moore et al., 2009; Synofzik et al., 2008; Vosgerau and
ynofzik, 2012). This is the case when our actions may  produce a
umber of different consequences or when there are other agents
ho also perform actions that may  produce multiple outcomes.
or example, when you make a funny face and people start laugh-
ng, you may  have predicted their laughter, but that does not mean
ou were the one that made them laugh. They may  as well be
aughing because someone is imitating you in a funny way. In such
ituations people have to rely on cognitive inferential processes
o arrive at the experience that they (rather than someone else)
ere the cause of their own actions and resulting outcomes. Hence,
atients who have impairments in motor prediction processes are
robably chronically more dependent on such cognitive inferen-
ial processes (Horan et al., 2012; Metcalfe et al., 2012). As a result,
hey are more susceptible to cognitive biases and beliefs that may
irect their agency experiences toward over- or under-attribution
Bentall et al., 1994; Martin and Penn, 2002; Thompson et al., 2013).
Explicit cognitive expectations. According to the cognitive infer-
ntial account to self-agency people typically infer that they caused
 behavioral outcome when this outcome matches the outcome
hey had in mind (Wegner, 2002; see right part of Fig. 6). For exam-
le, if you were craving pasta all day and you come home to discover
hat your partner made pasta for dinner, you may  feel that you
omehow, magically, caused your partner to do so. In some situa-
ions people have a certain outcome in mind because they have
n explicit goal to reach a certain outcome (e.g., eating pasta).
et, most (especially social) behavior is not planned or intentionalbehavioral Reviews 57 (2015) 220–237
(Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Custers and Aarts, 2010; Fourneret and
Jeannerod, 1998; Moskowitz, 2002; Soon et al., 2008). Still, peo-
ple can experience self-agency over this ‘unintentional’ behavior
and its consequences. So, how do experiences of self-agency over
behavioral outcomes unfold in ambiguous (social) situations char-
acterized by the absence of an explicit goal and associated motor
predictions?
Implicit cognitive expectations. Recent studies showed that the
inferential process underlying experiences of self-agency is not
only susceptible to goal-directed processes, but also to subtle envi-
ronmental cues that carry information about the outcomes of our
actions outside of conscious awareness. In experimental tasks, such
subtle outcome information is presented with an intensity that is
too low to reach the threshold of conscious awareness (i.e., sub-
liminal priming). One commonly used experimental task aimed at
assessing cognitive agency inferences is the so-called ‘wheel of for-
tune task’ (Aarts et al., 2005; Belayachi and Van der Linden, 2010;
Dannenberg et al., 2012; Renes et al., 2015; van der Weiden et al.,
2013b). This task requires participants to move a gray square along
a rectangular path consisting of eight white squares in counter-
clockwise direction. At the same time the computer moves another
gray square at the same speed in the opposite direction. After some
time, a stop cue appears, and participants have to stop the move-
ment of the squares by pressing a stop button. The moment that
they press the stop button ostensibly determines on what loca-
tions the gray squares will stop. In actuality, participants have no
actual control (i.e., the computer always determines the squares’
stop locations), rendering internal motor predictions unreliable and
uninformative for attributing agency. Crucially, participants only
get to see one of the squares’ stop locations, presented in black to
make the cause of this outcome ambiguous. After each trial, par-
ticipants rate the extent to which they feel that they caused their
square to stop on the presented location, as a measure of experi-
enced self-agency. To manipulate their experiences of self-agency,
participants are either assigned the goal to stop their square on a
speciﬁc location, or are brieﬂy primed with the location instead. The
presented stop location either matches or mismatches this goal or
prime.
Indeed, experienced self-agency is generally increased when an
action–outcome matches one’s explicit goal, and decreased when
an action–outcome mismatches one’s explicit goal (Aarts et al.,
2005; van der Weiden et al., 2013b). Similarly, experienced self-
agency is generally enhanced when an action-outcome has been
primed in advance, even though people do not consciously detect
the outcome primes (Aarts et al., 2005; Belayachi and Van der
Linden, 2010; Sato, 2009; van der Weiden et al., 2013b). Thus, cog-
nitive expectations underlying agency experiences can be shaped
by explicit goals as well as implicit primes, albeit through differ-
ent mechanisms and with different consequences (van der Weiden
et al., 2013b).
Cognitive agency processing in schizophrenia.  Surprisingly, in
patients with schizophrenia, these cognitive inferential processes
have not yet received much attention. Only recently, we  conducted
a study on the inﬂuence of both implicit and explicit outcome cues
(i.e., goals and primes) on experiences of self-agency in healthy con-
trols and schizophrenia patients (Renes et al., 2013). In this study,
participants performed the ‘wheel of fortune task’ as described
above.
Results showed that both healthy controls and schizophre-
nia patients experienced more self-agency over outcomes that
matched, rather than mismatched the goals (see also Voss et al.,
2010), although patients overall experienced less self-agency (i.e.,
under-attribution of agency). Moreover, in contrast to controls,
the implicit outcome primes had no effect on experiences of self-
agency in patients. Importantly, in line with the notion that fast
bottom-up visual processing is intact in schizophrenia (Del Cul
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Fig. 7. This ﬁgure illustrates how schizophrenia patients deviate from healthy controls when attributing agency over outcomes that are slightly deviant from internal motor
predictions. The blue arrow shows how errors in motor prediction (e.g., temporal or spatial deviations) weigh stronger than cognitive inferences and normally lead to the
attribution of agency to others. The orange arrow depicts how schizophrenia patients’ insensitivity to motor prediction errors causes them to attribute agency based on
cognitive expectations. Thus, when outcomes are slightly deviant but still match cognitive expectations (e.g., when hearing one’s own voice a few milliseconds later), patients
will  over-attribute agency to themselves. However, when outcomes are not as expected (i.e., in the absence of an explicit expectation or when outcomes deviate to a large
extent  from one’s expectation, e.g., when hearing a voice that is clearly and qualitatively different from one’s own), patients tend to attribute agency to others, and as such


































tnder-attribute agency to themselves. (For interpretation of the references to color
t al., 2006), we recently replicated and extended this ﬁnding by
howing that schizophrenia patients were unable to use implicit
utcome information when inferring self-agency, regardless of
heir intact ability to visually process and attend to the implicit
utcome primes (Renes et al., 2015).
Thus, in the presence of others and in the absence of an explicit
oal to reach a speciﬁc outcome, patients grope in the dark and are
ikely to under-attribute agency to themselves. Patients’ inability to
se subtle, implicit cues that convey information on what outcome
o expect when performing an action may  be particularly problem-
tic in social interaction where information is usually implicitly
vailable (e.g., in non-verbal communication). These ﬁndings thus
onverge with patients’ general inability to take the social context
nto account (Green et al., 2008; Hemsley, 2005a,b; Penn et al.,
002).
The weighing of motor predictions and cognitive expectations in
chizophrenia.  In contrast to implicit agency processing, patients
howed no impairments in experiencing self-agency over out-
omes that matched their explicitly set goals in our study. However,
xplicit agency processing may  under certain circumstances bias
atients to over- or under-attribute agency to themselves (Maeda
t al., 2012; Renes et al., 2013; Schimansky et al., 2010). That is,
hereas errors in motor prediction (e.g., temporal or spatial devi-
tions) usually weigh stronger than cognitive inferences (Moore
t al., 2009; Synofzik et al., 2009) and normally lead to the attri-
ution of agency to others (see blue arrow in Fig. 7), schizophrenia
atients’ insensitivity to motor prediction errors causes them to
ttribute agency based on their cognitive outcome expectations
e.g., based on goal achievement; orange arrow in Fig. 7).
Thus, when outcomes are slightly deviant but still match
heir cognitive expectations (e.g., when hearing one’s own  voice
 few milliseconds later), patients will over-attribute agency to
hemselves. Indeed, in the studies discussed earlier that showed
ver-attributions of agency in schizophrenia, outcomes may  have
een deviant (e.g., movement feedback of the cursor differed in
nset, pace, or path), but were always congruent with the goal
hey were pursuing (e.g., the cursor reached the intended location).s ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Yet, when outcomes are not as expected (i.e., in the absence of an
explicit expectation or when outcomes deviate to a large extent
from one’s expectation, e.g., when hearing a voice that is clearly and
qualitatively different from one’s own), patients tend to attribute
agency to others, and as such under-attribute agency to themselves.
Cognitive outcome expectations, and hence agency attributions,
may  be crucially modulated by cognitive biases and personal beliefs
(Aarts and van den Bos, 2011; Desantis et al., 2011; Fitch, 1970).
Since patients excessively rely on cognitive inferences, they may
be even more susceptible to such cognitive biases and beliefs.
For instance, as a result of impaired motor predictions, patients
may  develop the belief that their actions bare no relation to the
events they observe in their environment whatsoever (i.e., defeatist
beliefs; see van der Weiden et al., 2011). Similarly, some patients
may  actually develop the belief that they can cause virtually any
external event (i.e., grandiose beliefs). Such beliefs may  bias agency
attributions toward under and over attributions of agency respec-
tively, thereby further reinforcing prior beliefs.
This way, patients’ impairments in processing implicitly avail-
able information may  not only underlie attributional biases, but
may  also reinforce their bias against disconﬁrmatory evidence
(Garety and Freeman, 1999; Penn et al., 2008; Woodward et al.,
2006). In line with this notion, recent research showed that patients
who predominantly had positive symptoms were more likely to
over-attribute agency over deviant yet goal-congruent outcomes
to themselves (Maeda et al., 2013, 2012), whereas patients who
predominantly had negative symptoms were more likely to under-
attribute agency over deviant yet goal-congruent outcomes to
themselves (Maeda et al., 2013). Perhaps patients with predom-
inantly positive symptoms have higher expectations of reaching
their goals than do patients with predominantly negative symp-
toms. Such expectations may  also bias patients with predominantly
positive symptoms toward under-attributions of agency when
outcomes are goal-incongruent (i.e., when hearing voices with
negative content). Given the crucial role of beliefs in agency attri-
butions in schizophrenia, it would be interesting for future research
to test the effect of therapies aimed at reducing defeatist beliefs in
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Table  2
Summary of motor and cognitive processes involved in schizophrenia patients’ impairments in self-perception, and their implications for normal (in italic) versus abnormal
(in  bold) self–other integration and self–other distinction.





1.  Action awareness




•  Temporal binding Integration of predicted multisensory
signals that occur in close temporal
proximity
Integration of a variety of multisensory
signals that do not belong together due






2.  Agency attribution
• Motor prediction Mispredictions lead to less
experienced self-agency





•  Implicit cues Matching outcome representations
enhance experienced self-agency
Matching outcome representations do


























c•  Goal attainment Enhances experienced self-agency Enhances
atients with symptoms of under-attribution (i.e., delusions of con-
rol, thought broadcasting, thought insertion, thought withdrawal,
r auditory (verbal) hallucinations).
In conclusion, when investigating agency attribution in
chizophrenia patients, it is essential to take into account motor as
ell as cognitive processes, implicitly as well as explicitly available
utcome information, and cognitive biases and beliefs that may
r may  not be expressed in schizophrenia symptoms. These fac-
ors may  jointly or independently drive patients to either over- or
nder-attribute agency to themselves, and as such distinguish self
rom others.
. Summary part 2
To summarize (see also Table 2), in part 2 we showed how motor
redictions and cognitive expectations aid the distinction of self
nd other as the cause of behavior, as reﬂected in self-awareness
nd attributions of agency. Speciﬁcally, as a consequence of reli-
ble internal motor predictions, one’s own behavioral outcomes
re generally perceived as less intense (i.e., sensory attenuation;
lakemore et al., 1998; Roussel et al., 2013) and as temporally closer
o the performance of action (i.e., temporal binding; Haggard et al.,
003; Moore and Haggard, 2008). As such, motor predictions aid
elf–other distinction, as is also supported by the role of motor
ig. 8. This integrative model illustrates how the distinction between self (upper part of m
f  the model) and cognitive expectation (right part of the model) processes. The red cros
olor  in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web  version of this article.)rienced self-agency Normal attribution of
agency to self
predictions in attributions of agency (Sato, 2009; van der Weiden
et al., 2011). Because schizophrenia patients have impaired motor
predictions (Farrer and Franck, 2007), they typically struggle to dis-
tinguish self from other (Blakemore et al., 2000; Johns et al., 2001;
Renes et al., 2013). Importantly, when motor predictions are less
reliable, as is the case in schizophrenia, the distinction between self
and other is crucially inﬂuenced by cognitive expectations about
the outcomes of our actions (Aarts et al., 2005; van der Weiden
et al., 2013a,b). These cognitive expectations are biased by patients’
symptoms and may  lead to over- as well as under-attributions of
agency (Maeda et al., 2013, 2012). As such, cognitive expectation
processes are potentially interesting targets for cognitive therapy
with the aim of improving self–other distinction and social func-
tioning.
6. Concluding remarks
As follows from the theoretical models and empirical stud-
ies reviewed above, self–other distinction is the product of
motor prediction and cognitive processes that are involved in the
understanding of other people’s behaviors and emotions (other-
perspective) as well as the understanding of one’s own behaviors
and emotions (self-perspective). Fig. 8 shows an integrative model
of the processes involved in self–other distinction.
odel) and other (lower part of model) results from both motor prediction (left part
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So far, research on self–other processing in schizophrenia
eglected the notion that self–other integration and self–other
istinction are inextricably intertwined, and this has usually not
een recognized in experimental set-ups. Yet, as we argued, both
ntegration and distinction play a key role in the development of
sychotic symptoms and impairments in social functioning. In the
resent review, we discussed how models that were developed to
ap  either self-perception (self-perspective) or the perception of
thers (other-perspective) explain self–other integration as well as
elf–other distinction.
.1. Self–other integration
Motor.  Classic motor prediction models that took center stage in
ost research on self–other processing account for patients’ ability
o integrate self and other. Speciﬁcally, mirror neurons are active
or both self-produced and other-produced actions. This enables
atients to understand basic intentions of others. However, patients
end to integrate the behaviors and emotions of others too much,
ue to increased motor simulation (reﬂected in abnormal ﬁrst order
oM) and an increased temporal binding window (reﬂected in
bnormal action awareness).
Cognitive. Importantly, we further showed how cognitive biases
nd demands (e.g., processing speed) cause patients to incorrectly
ntegrate and hence misunderstand more complex and dynamic
ntentions and emotions (reﬂected in abnormal second order
oM). As such, we have provided a framework for understanding
chizophrenia patients’ impairments in theory of mind, which have
een a topic of debate in the literature. In addition, we  showed
hat patients’ incorrect integration causes them to inappropriately
espond to and bond with others (reﬂected in abnormal mimicry).
.2. Self–other distinction
Motor.  Although patients show mirror neuron activation for
heir own as well as others’ actions, the amount of activation does
ot differentiate between their own and others’ actions, resulting
n a lack of distinction between their own and others’ behaviors
nd emotions. This is reﬂected in patients’ abnormal action aware-
ess (i.e., decreased sensory attenuation and an increased temporal
inding window) and over-attributions of agency.
Cognitive. We  also introduced a new perspective on abnor-
al  agency attribution, by explaining how impairments in both
otor prediction (i.e., reduced awareness of subtle distortions)
nd cognitive processes (i.e., biased expectations) may  lead to over
ersus under-attribution of agency, as apparent in speciﬁc psy-
hotic symptoms.
In some areas integration and distinction are more difﬁcult to
isentangle based on the existing literature. For example, patients’
bnormalities in theory of mind (e.g., emotion contagion) may
esult from increased neural activation in response to others’ inten-
ions or emotions, or from decreased down-regulation of others’
ntentions or emotions relative to their own intentions or emo-
ions (Decety and Meyer, 2008). Similarly, in temporal binding,
ncreased integration of self and other (and hence a reduced ability
o differentiate between one’s own and others’ actions) may  follow
rom impaired motor prediction (reduced distinction) as well as
rom too much simulation of others’ actions (increased integra-
ion). Also with regard to mimicry, it remains an open question
hether patients’ reduced mimicry reﬂects an absence of mimicry
i.e., reduced integration or increased distinction), or merely incor-
ect mimicry (and thus incorrect integration). Future research may
hed more light on how integration and distinction processes inter-
ct to shape people’s perception and understanding of their own
nd others’ behaviors and emotions.behavioral Reviews 57 (2015) 220–237 233
To conclude, there is more to self–other processing than
meets the eye. Hence, in order to enhance our understanding of
self–other processing and impairments herein in schizophrenia,
future research should take into account the complexity of social
perception and behavior. Speciﬁcally, we argue that disentangling
self–other integration and distinction, as well as motor prediction
and cognitive expectation processes, will crucially advance current
research on social cognition and social functioning in both healthy
controls and schizophrenia patients, and may serve to improve
patients’ understanding, coordination, and attribution of behavior,
and ultimately, their quality of social life.
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